Financial Interests and Economic Diversity in State Legislatures

Objective: I examine how the prevalence of U.S. state legislators economically connected to an industry, and the diversity of economic connections in a legislature, vary in response to the employment share of that industry in the state, the partisan split of the legislature, and professionalization (or its components). Methods: I use conflict-of-interest filings for 1999-2000, 2000 Census employment data, and related data to examine the prevalence of connections to several sectors using seemingly unrelated regression. Results: The employment share of an industry in the state is a powerful predictor of connections to that industry among legislators, as is the partisan split of the chamber. Professionalization plays a role, dominated by its pay component, but to a smaller degree. Professionalization is the primary predictor of the diversity of connections. Conclusion: Legislators' economic connections are driven in part by underlying conditions such as the economic makeup of the state.