Genealogy and social practices

In this chapter I argue that Nietzsche’s genealogical approach is best understood as manifesting certain commitments that are common in the social sciences. Nietzsche’s genealogy treats distinctively social phenomena as natural; social kinds and activities are fully part of the world and susceptible to inquiry as such. Genealogies of social phenomena do not require reducing them to impersonal nature, but approaching them with the methodological commitments and conceptual resources appropriate to making sense of practices. In order to make my case, I outline three basic, interrelated elements of social-scientific approaches to understanding social phenomena and I argue that Nietzsche’s genealogy shares those elements. I call these elements ‘interpretation’, ‘immanence’ and ‘practices’. I conclude by connecting Nietzsche’s attention to meaning, power and agency in his treatment of the social to the normative work that Nietzsche expects genealogy to perform. Although my focus here is on clarifying genealogy’s explanatory task, for Nietzsche this task dovetails with genealogy’s critical function.