Perfect competition in strategic market games with interlinked preferences

Pradeep Dubey; Martin Shubik

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(85)90115-6

Perfect competition in strategic market games with interlinked preferences

Pradeep Dubey
, Martin Shubik

Economics

Stony Brook University

Cowles Foundation

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

When the competitive system is viewed as a strategic market game with a continuum of agents, concern for others need not influence outcomes. The generalization of preference conditions is noted and discussed.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	3-4
Number of pages	2
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	17
Issue number	1-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(85)90115-6
State	Published - 1985

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title = "Perfect competition in strategic market games with interlinked preferences",

abstract = "When the competitive system is viewed as a strategic market game with a continuum of agents, concern for others need not influence outcomes. The generalization of preference conditions is noted and discussed.",

author = "Pradeep Dubey and Martin Shubik",

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AU - Shubik, Martin

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DO - 10.1016/0165-1765(85)90115-6

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VL - 17

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 1-2

ER -

Perfect competition in strategic market games with interlinked preferences

Abstract

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