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Quantum information-flow security: Noninterference and access control

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Quantum cryptography has been extensively studied in the last twenty years, but information-flow security of quantum computing and communication systems has been almost untouched in the previous research. Due to the essential difference between classical and quantum systems, formal methods developed for classical systems, including probabilistic systems, cannot be directly applied to quantum systems. This paper defines an automata model in which we can rigorously reason about information-flow security of quantum systems. The model is a quantum generalisation of Goguen and Meseguer's noninterference. The unwinding proof technique for quantum noninterference is developed, and a certain compositionality of security for quantum systems is established. The proposed formalism is then used to prove security of access control in quantum systems.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2013 IEEE 26th Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2013
Pages130-144
Number of pages15
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Event2013 IEEE 26th Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2013 - New Orleans, LA, United States
Duration: Jun 26 2013Jun 28 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop

Conference

Conference2013 IEEE 26th Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityNew Orleans, LA
Period06/26/1306/28/13

Keywords

  • quantum computing; quantum communication; security; information-flow; noninterference; access control

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