TY - GEN
T1 - RevEAL
T2 - 2022 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2022
AU - Aydin, Furkan
AU - Karabulut, Emre
AU - Potluri, Seetal
AU - Alkim, Erdem
AU - Aysu, Aydin
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2022 EDAA.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - This paper demonstrates the first side-channel attack on homomorphic encryption (HE), which allows computing on encrypted data. We reveal a power-based side-channel leakage of Microsoft SEAL prior to v3.6 that implements the Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) protocol. Our proposed attack targets the Gaussian sampling in the SEAL's encryption phase and can extract the entire message with a single power measurement. Our attack works by (1) identifying each coefficient index being sampled, (2) extracting the sign value of the coefficients from control-flow variations, (3) recovering the coefficients with a high probability from data-flow variations, and (4) using a Blockwise Korkine-Zolotarev (BKZ) algorithm to efficiently explore and estimate the remaining search space. Using real power measurements, the results on a RISC-V FPGA implementation of the SEAL (v3.2) show that the proposed attack can reduce the plaintext encryption security level from 2128 to 24.4. Therefore, as HE gears toward real-world applications, such attacks and related defenses should be considered.
AB - This paper demonstrates the first side-channel attack on homomorphic encryption (HE), which allows computing on encrypted data. We reveal a power-based side-channel leakage of Microsoft SEAL prior to v3.6 that implements the Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) protocol. Our proposed attack targets the Gaussian sampling in the SEAL's encryption phase and can extract the entire message with a single power measurement. Our attack works by (1) identifying each coefficient index being sampled, (2) extracting the sign value of the coefficients from control-flow variations, (3) recovering the coefficients with a high probability from data-flow variations, and (4) using a Blockwise Korkine-Zolotarev (BKZ) algorithm to efficiently explore and estimate the remaining search space. Using real power measurements, the results on a RISC-V FPGA implementation of the SEAL (v3.2) show that the proposed attack can reduce the plaintext encryption security level from 2128 to 24.4. Therefore, as HE gears toward real-world applications, such attacks and related defenses should be considered.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85130830124
U2 - 10.23919/DATE54114.2022.9774724
DO - 10.23919/DATE54114.2022.9774724
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - Proceedings of the 2022 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2022
SP - 1527
EP - 1532
BT - Proceedings of the 2022 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2022
A2 - Bolchini, Cristiana
A2 - Verbauwhede, Ingrid
A2 - Vatajelu, Ioana
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 14 March 2022 through 23 March 2022
ER -