TY - GEN
T1 - SA-Based PMU Network Upgrade for Detectability of GPS Spoofing Attacks
AU - Sarailoo, Morteza
AU - Wu, N. Eva
AU - Bay, John S.
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2019 IEEE.
PY - 2019/8
Y1 - 2019/8
N2 - Synchrophasor availability-based (SA-based) optimal PMU placement [1] has been developed to meet any specified long-run data availability profile across all buses in a power system in addition to providing synchrophasor observability, despite, for example, communication interruptions. In this paper, we impose a local detectability condition to the SA-based PMU placement problem to ensure that the resulting placement can also detect a GPS spoofing attack on any PMU using only a partial transmission circuit bordered by some PMUs, including the attacked PMU. The partial circuit is called a partition resulting from the application of a partition algorithm reported in [2] specific to the placement solution. Upon placement and partition, the performance of a proposed detection and isolation algorithm of GPS spoofing attacks is evaluated under different attack scenarios for the IEEE 300-bus system, including coordinated attacks, and the results are reported in this work.
AB - Synchrophasor availability-based (SA-based) optimal PMU placement [1] has been developed to meet any specified long-run data availability profile across all buses in a power system in addition to providing synchrophasor observability, despite, for example, communication interruptions. In this paper, we impose a local detectability condition to the SA-based PMU placement problem to ensure that the resulting placement can also detect a GPS spoofing attack on any PMU using only a partial transmission circuit bordered by some PMUs, including the attacked PMU. The partial circuit is called a partition resulting from the application of a partition algorithm reported in [2] specific to the placement solution. Upon placement and partition, the performance of a proposed detection and isolation algorithm of GPS spoofing attacks is evaluated under different attack scenarios for the IEEE 300-bus system, including coordinated attacks, and the results are reported in this work.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85079041411
U2 - 10.1109/PESGM40551.2019.8973393
DO - 10.1109/PESGM40551.2019.8973393
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting
BT - 2019 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2019
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 2019 IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, PESGM 2019
Y2 - 4 August 2019 through 8 August 2019
ER -