Strategic play among family members when making long-term care decisions

Bridget Hiedemann; Steven Stern

doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00041-4

Strategic play among family members when making long-term care decisions

Bridget Hiedemann
, Steven Stern

Economics

Stony Brook University

Seattle University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

68 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper describes a strategic model of bargaining within a family to determine how to care for an elderly parent. We estimate the parameters of the model using data from the National Long-term Care Survey. We find that the parameter estimates generally make sense and that the model is consistent with the data. The results have strong implications for using less structural empirical models for policy analysis.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	29-57
Number of pages	29
Journal	Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume	40
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00041-4
State	Published - Sep 1999

Keywords

Family bargaining
Long-term care
Structural estimation

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10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00041-4

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title = "Strategic play among family members when making long-term care decisions",

abstract = "This paper describes a strategic model of bargaining within a family to determine how to care for an elderly parent. We estimate the parameters of the model using data from the National Long-term Care Survey. We find that the parameter estimates generally make sense and that the model is consistent with the data. The results have strong implications for using less structural empirical models for policy analysis.",

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AB - This paper describes a strategic model of bargaining within a family to determine how to care for an elderly parent. We estimate the parameters of the model using data from the National Long-term Care Survey. We find that the parameter estimates generally make sense and that the model is consistent with the data. The results have strong implications for using less structural empirical models for policy analysis.

KW - Family bargaining

KW - Long-term care

KW - Structural estimation

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0033196682

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DO - 10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00041-4

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JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

IS - 1

ER -

Strategic play among family members when making long-term care decisions

Abstract

Keywords

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