The role of information in contests

Pradeep Dubey

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.010

The role of information in contests

Pradeep Dubey

Economics

Stony Brook University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

16 Scopus citations

Abstract

Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his/her own ability, but may or may not know those of his/her rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more effort and output are engendered under incomplete information, whereas, if the value is low, that distinction goes to complete information.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	160-163
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	120
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.010
State	Published - Aug 2013

Keywords

Contests
Information
Nash equilibrium
Prizes

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10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.010

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title = "The role of information in contests",

abstract = "Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his/her own ability, but may or may not know those of his/her rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more effort and output are engendered under incomplete information, whereas, if the value is low, that distinction goes to complete information.",

keywords = "Contests, Information, Nash equilibrium, Prizes",

author = "Pradeep Dubey",

year = "2013",

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T1 - The role of information in contests

AU - Dubey, Pradeep

PY - 2013/8

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N2 - Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his/her own ability, but may or may not know those of his/her rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more effort and output are engendered under incomplete information, whereas, if the value is low, that distinction goes to complete information.

AB - Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his/her own ability, but may or may not know those of his/her rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more effort and output are engendered under incomplete information, whereas, if the value is low, that distinction goes to complete information.

KW - Contests

KW - Information

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Prizes

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84877908678

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.010

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.010

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 120

SP - 160

EP - 163

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

IS - 2

ER -

The role of information in contests

Abstract

Keywords

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