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Unnecessarily identifiable: Quantifying the fingerprintability of browser extensions due to bloat

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

35 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate to what extent the page modifications that make browser extensions fingerprintable are necessary for their operation. We characterize page modifications that are completely unnecessary for the extension's functionality as extension bloat. By analyzing 58,034 extensions from the Google Chrome store, we discovered that 5.7% of them were unnecessarily identifiable because of extension bloat. To protect users against unnecessary extension fingerprinting due to bloat, we describe the design and implementation of an in-browser mechanism that provides coarse-grained access control for extensions on all websites. The proposed mechanism and its built-in policies, does not only protect users from fingerprinting, but also offers additional protection against malicious extensions exfiltrating user data from sensitive websites.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Web Conference 2019 - Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference, WWW 2019
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
Pages3244-3250
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9781450366748
DOIs
StatePublished - May 13 2019
Event2019 World Wide Web Conference, WWW 2019 - San Francisco, United States
Duration: May 13 2019May 17 2019

Publication series

NameThe Web Conference 2019 - Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference, WWW 2019

Conference

Conference2019 World Wide Web Conference, WWW 2019
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Francisco
Period05/13/1905/17/19

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