Abstract
Some philosophers think that there is a gap between is and ought which necessarily makes normative enquiry a different kind of thing than empirical science. This position gains support from our ability to explicate our inferential practices in a way that makes it impermissible to move from descriptive premises to a normative conclusion. But we can also explicate them in a way that allows such moves. So there is no categorical answer as to whether there is or is not a gap. The question of an is-ought gap is a practical and strategic matter rather than a logical one, and it may properly be answered in different ways for different questions or at different times.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 373-393 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Journal of Moral Philosophy |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2017 |
Keywords
- Hume's law
- inference barrier
- is-ought gap
- metaethics
- normativity
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