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What Kind of Is-Ought Gap is There and What Kind Ought There Be?

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Abstract

Some philosophers think that there is a gap between is and ought which necessarily makes normative enquiry a different kind of thing than empirical science. This position gains support from our ability to explicate our inferential practices in a way that makes it impermissible to move from descriptive premises to a normative conclusion. But we can also explicate them in a way that allows such moves. So there is no categorical answer as to whether there is or is not a gap. The question of an is-ought gap is a practical and strategic matter rather than a logical one, and it may properly be answered in different ways for different questions or at different times.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)373-393
Number of pages21
JournalJournal of Moral Philosophy
Volume14
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2017

Keywords

  • Hume's law
  • inference barrier
  • is-ought gap
  • metaethics
  • normativity

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